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THE HISTORY OF THE CONTEMPT POWER*
Ronald Goldfarbi"
INTRODUCTION
Contempt can be generally defined as an act of disobedience or dis-
respect toward a judicial or legislative body, or interference with its
orderly process, for which a summary punishment is usually exacted.
In a grander view, it is a power assumed by governmental bodies to
coerce cooperation, and punish criticism or interference, even of a
causally indirect nature. In legal literature, it has been categorized,
subclassified, and scholastically dignified by division into varying
shades--each covering some particular aspect of the general power,
respectively governed by a particular procedure. So, the texts separate
retributive or criminal coritempts from merely coercive or civil con-
tempts--those directly offensive from those only constructively con-
temptuous-those affecting the judiciary and others the legislature.
The implementation of this power has taken place predominantly in
England and America, and has recently been accelerated into a con-
tinuingly greater role in the United States.
The legal literature of the common law is replete with references to
the contempt power. It occupies so accepted a place in Anglo-Ameri-
can law that questions are less addressed to whether or not the power
should exist than to what extent it can be exercised and what are its
limitations. But indeed, to the non-common lawyer the contempt
* This article will be the first chapter in a forthcoming book which will deal
with the history, varieties, and implications of the contempt power. My work for
the last eight months has been sponsored by the Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Lib-
erties Program at N.Y.U. Law School. Professor Paul Oberst, the director of
this program, has been a constant friend and critic to me and my project. He
has my sincerest respect and thanks. Professors Gerhard 0. Mueller and Thomas
Frank of N.Y.U. Law School read and commented on this chapter, and have my
gratitude for their considerations. In addition, I am grateful to the Washington
University Law Quarterly for its kind and receptive interest in my work.
t Arthur Garfield Hays Fellow, New York University Law School.
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power is a legal technique which is not only unnecessary to a working
legal system, but also violative of basic philosophical approaches to the
relations between government bodies and people.1 Neither Latin
American nor European civil law legal systems use any device of the
nature or proportions of our contempt power. While critics of these
systems may make preferential comparisons, so long as these countries
keep someplace within anarchy on the one hand and totalitarianism on
the other, there is room to question whether indeed this power is as
necessary and essential as our decision-makers suggest.
Cases in England and the United States which treat the contempt
power all assume that the order of society's affairs dictates that this
power is inherent in the very nature of governmental bodies, and that
all individuals sacrifice some portion of their civil liberties to this
needed expedient when they adopt their social contract. Civil lawyers
have voiced the fear that such a concession would allow governmental
arbitrariness. Though these countries recognize to some extent the
propriety of punishment for past consequences (some criminal con-
tempts), they recoil at the suggestion of punishment for the purpose
of coercing an individual to act in a certain way in the future (civil
contempt). Though criminal contempts are sometimes accepted in
civil law systems (if limited and under different labels), these legal
systems draw a distinction between punishment as a willed conse-
quence of human behavior, and contempt as a means of coercing the
commission o certain desired acts. This difference of approach in the
use of a power like contempt underscores an anomalous difference in
the recognition of individual values in the ideology of a system of law.
For example, it has been pointed out that the magnitude of the coer-
cive penalty in civil contempts is measured by the resistance to be
overcome rather than the gravity of what has been done. Though all
societies punish people for what they have done, only the common law
punishes man "in order to do violence to his incoercible freedom to do
or not to do something."2 Moreover, the injury which caused the con-
tempt proceedings (here again we deal with civil contempt) is often
incapable of reparation, deterrence, repentance, or reformation,
which goals are here secondary to personal punishment. The sanction
is aimed at a resisting will.
Anglophiles will jump to the argument that theirs is not a system
directed by ideologies of individuality. They are correct. Yet, it takes
some straining of reason to include the contempt power within the
best characteristics of Anglo-American, freedom-conscious law. And
I. For an interesting analysis of contempt as a comparative legal technique,
see Pekelis. Legal Techniques and Political Ideologies: A Comparative Study,
41 Mich. L. Rev. 665, 671 (1943).
2. Id. at 674.
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even assuming the value of this power device in a legal system such as
ours, it is still another question whether it ought to be exercised either
in the procedural manner or to the quantitative extent that it is now.
The summary and comparatively unlimited exercise of the power com-
pounds the danger to individual freedom which its mere existence
implies. More subtle, intangible social results are likely to derive from
this latter aspect.
This legal problem is then one with deep philosophical undertones,
far-reaching political implications, and, as we shall see, historical in-
consistencies. The fact that its status and value have been scantily and
infrequently analyzed is but one of the purposes of this book But
because its position, if not its acceptance, as an American govern-
mental power vehicle, raises these deep and probing problems, their
exposure, if not their solution, must be still another goal.
The American ideology is one based upon recognition of the rights
and liberties of the individual. This concept was ensured by the archi-
tects of our government when they created this republic, one in which
all men are, at least philosophically, sovereign, while government is
but the vehicle of their sovereignty. The manifestation of this dream
was encouraged by bitter memories of monarchial experience-the
hope for individual liberation. How can it then be that man can be
contumacious to a sovereign which is, theoretically at least, the ulti-
mate extension of himself; or inversely, should government, created
by, of, and for man be allowed to punish the exercise of the will of its
constituent self?3 And if so, is the summary contempt procedure, by
which the contemnor is brought before and tried by the offended party,
without jury, counsel, defense, and ordinary appeal, either right or
reasonable? Is this scheme of governmental power consistent with
our constitutional principles of jury trial, self-incrimination, non-ex-
cessive punishments, free press and speech, double jeopardy, fair
trial?
Aside from contemporary, mid-twentieth century conflicts, can the
contempt power be traced to a proper historical foundation? Or was
the comment, some time ago made by one student of the problem, cor-
rect that this criminal, arbitrary power is less unassailable than un-
questioned historically, though it is "foreign to the whole spirit of
Anglo-American jurisprudence"'?
In dealing with legal problems, Americans are faced with what are
often the paradoxes and anomalies of the common law. These rules
of law, so long-stated and often expedient, seem to be ensconced in a
sacrosanctity of age and prestige, which often fools its subjects, as
3. For an inverse application of this theory, see Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss.
331, 341 (1858).
4. Thomas, Problems of Contempt of Court 5 (1934).
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the king's tailors did the people, in the funny tale by Andersen. Then
is it when scholarship needs to combine with fortitude to focus a
truer vision on contemporary values, as the young boy by his naive
shout jolted the people into seeing the king's nudity. Historical re-
search and pragmatic assessment cast serious doubts upon historical
rationales for the contempt power, as we shall see.
Are the rationales, other than historical precedence, offered in
defense of the contempt power, apropos of American political relation-
ships? Need courts and congresses have this power in order to operate
efficiently, or at all? If so, is there an alternative more suited to ex-
pedience, as well as political propriety?
Though the subject of contempt has occupied an increasingly more
common role in the newspapers, and in the political comments and
writings of recent times, the subject is one that has long been with
students of Anglo-American law, and government. Its prestige has
vacillated. Throughout different times in history, both in the United
States and in England, it has been used in ways that have provoked
great public interest. Depending upon the time and situation, its func-
tion as a manifestation of governmental power over individuals has
provoked praise, and demands for its exercise, as it has condemnation
and criticism. Both in Shakespeare's Henry IV, Part 2,5 and The
Lives of the Chief Justices of England,6 one can read of the escapades
of ruddy Prince Hal, later to become Henry V of England, and his
notorious brush with the law of contempt. When Hal was the Prince
of Wales, one of his servants was arrested for committing a felony.
Upon his servant's arraignment at the King's Bench, the Prince
appeared in a rage, and demanded that his man be let free. Chief Jus-
tice Gascoigne, delicately but firmly ruled that the laws of the realm
must be met, and that if the Prince wished his servant to be pardoned
he should secure this from the King, his father. The Prince tried
physically to take the servant away, whereupon Gascoigne ordered
him again to behave. When the Prince raged (and some say he even
struck Gascoigne) the judge reminded his prince that he kept the
peace of the King to whom even Hal owed allegiance, and suggested
that Hal set a good example. When Hal did not heed this advice, he
was sentenced for contempt, and committed to the King's Bench prison
until the King's pleasure could be known. People speculated whether
this would be the end of Gascoigne's career. It developed that the King
was pleased, and rejoiced that he had both a judge who dared to minis-
ter justice to his son, and a son who obeyed him (if reluctantly).?
5. Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part 2, Act 5, Scene 2.
6. 1 Campbell, The Lives of the Chief Justices of England 125-42 (1894).
7. Campbell, op. cit. supra note 6, referred to several amusing and in some
cases contradictory chronicles of this event.
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Centuries later another historical cause celebre involved the use of
the contempt power.- Major General Andrew Jackson, in command of
the city of New Orleans in 1814, heard rumors that the state legisla-
ture was thinking of capitulating to the British. Not knowing that
the war was actually over, and that peace had been declared by
treaty, Jackson was suspicious of the French volunteer troops who had
been leaving the ranks. He ordered them out of the city. Lewis Lou-
allier wrote an article in the local press critical of General Jackson's
conduct. Jackson ordered his arrest and imprisonment. Louallier then
brought habeas corpus proceedings before Judge Hall of the district
court. The judge granted his release. Jackson went into another rage,
and arrested Hall. Then, United States Attorney Dick brought habeas
corpus proceedings for release of Judge Hall, and it was granted. He
joined Hall and Louallier in prison. After many judicial and political
machinations all parties were released, and Jackson learned that the
war was over. United States Attorney Dick then appeared before
Judge Hall and moved for General Jackson's punishment for contempt.
Jackson, shifting tactics, and under the good advisement of his attor-
ney, argued the inequities of contempt. He asserted that the summary
power of contempt violated his rights under the fifth and sixth amend-
ments. He ingeniously argued that the necessity which allowed cir-
cumvention of constitutional privileges in contempt cases was a lesser
one than the necessity which prompted his conduct. He had ordered
martial law because it was necessary for the preservation of the whole
country. Nonetheless he was found guilty of contempt and fined
$1,000. It has been reported that the memory of this incident plagued
Jackson until long after his later ascendency to the presidency.'
Finally, a year before his death, he successfully implored a congres-
sional representative to bring a bill before Congress to repay the
$1,000 to him, and vindicate his honor. This was eventually done.
More recently, the press has abounded with details of vexed officials
and assertive individuals, and their battles with the contempt power.
The era of the congressional committees, more than anything else, has
brought pervasive application of the contempt power. The conflicts
which have been aroused as a consequence of this have been many and
severe. How far government can go has been one of the most vital
questions of our middle twentieth century. Arthur Miller, better than
lawyers such as I, articulated this deep conflict in his statement before
a congressional committee, in which he unsuccessfully challenged the
right of government to pry. Yet, many liberals who deplored Miller's
8. For a more extensive and annotated treatment of this incident, see Deutsch,
The United States Versus Major General Andrew Jackson, 46 A.B.A.J. 966
(1960).
9. Id. at 972.
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conviction for contempt, applauded the contempt conviction of John
Kaspar, anti-integrationist leader in the Tennessee school riots. Per-
haps, this accommodating nature of the contempt power, by which it
can. be used in ways which appeal emotionally to large groups, yet
boomerang against its appreciators to the satisfaction of their critics,
has been one of the reasons for its long acceptance in the face of ar-
duous attack.
Because of the ramifications which these problems provoke, and
their seeming conflict with the basic American ideology of individual
freedom, some analysis and study was forthcoming. The purpose of
this book is to examine the history, varieties, and implications of the
power of contempt of court and Congress, to describe its birth, growth,
and maturation, and its conflicts with American notions of civil liber-
ties.
I. CONTEMPT OF COURT
The power of courts to punish contempts is one which wends histor-
ically back to the early days of England and the crown. A product of
the days of kingly rule, it began as a natural vehicle for assuring the
efficiency and dignity of, and respect for the governing sovereign.
Viewed as a legal doctrine which was articulated and immersed in the
common law, it is generally a product of Anglo-American society.
Whatever informal groups ruled, the primitive associations of men
undoubtedly looked to some pagan, religious, or divine and natural
right to enforce their systems. There is some evidence that schemes
akin to contempt were at least thought of in more antiquated societies.
One author reported that the Theodosian Code considered the subject
of contempt of a governmental authority, and concluded that it should
not be punishable; "for if it arose from madness, it was to be pitied;
if from levity, to be despised; and if from malice, to be forgiven."'' '
Such Taoistic reasoning, if not practical in the complex societies of our
age, at least recognizes that respect by compulsion is a contradiction
in terms, and the least ideal means to a free, libertarian government."
Respect can be more firmly based upon moral rightness than artificial
might.12
With the multi-millenary growth of organized societies, the sophis-
tication of governing systems, and the inter-complexity of the relation-
ships between sovereigns and men, some power force within a rule-of-
law scheme became necessary to replace the caveman's club as a means
10. Patterson, On Liberty of Speech and Press 18 (1939).
11. In the dissent to Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 218 (1958), it was
opined that respect and obedience in this country are not engendered by arbitrary
and automatic procedures, but that in the end such procedures yield only con-
tempt to the courts and the law.
12. Thomas, The Law of Constrictive Contempt (1934).
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of enforcing obedience and respect. Though centuries later men were
to accept the self-righting process, recommended by the writings of
men like Locke and Milton, as the more democratic way to resolve
individual-governmental conflict,13 the contempt power was more
suited to the early English rulers and their style of government. And
the law of contempt is not the law of men, it is the law of kings. It is
not law which representative legislators, responsibly reflecting the
vox populi originally wrote, but is rather evolved from the divine law
of kings, and its aspects of obedience, cooperation, and respect toward
government bodies. Though this is not the only source of the power,
it is the seed from which the power grew, if later adopted and culti-
vated by men not adverse to its exercise. These later institutions
agreeably accepted it, less as adjuncts of the King than to protect their
own dignity and supremacy.
The idea that the headman must be obeyed, at the risk of commit-
ting unnatural and punishable offense, cannot be traced with scientific
exactness to precise moment and place. It is agreed though that
authority for that premise can be traced in part to concepts of govern-
ment, both secular and religious. The idea that obedience to divine
commands was good, and disobedience sinful, has been traced to the
assertions of the early Popes, as well as the emperors."' It was prob-
ably not new with them. In enjoining obedience to civil government,
resort was often had to the Scripture. The king was called, early in
English history, the Vicar of God.1"' With the rise of the feudal system
in England, accompanying the pre-eminence of royal power after the
Norman Conquest, there developed manifestations of the idea of the
complete ownership, authority, and power of the king.6 This was but
another, though not different, step from the sanctity of the medicine-
man, the priestly character of primitive royalty, and the Christian
concepts of obedience-starting in Christian history with papal obe-
dience and bridging Middle Age centuries of monarchistic, secular
governments. 7
The contempt power is understandable when seen through the per-
spectives of its age of inception, an age of alleged divinely-ordained
monarchies, ruled by a king totally invested with all sovereign legal
powers and accountable only to God. Under any circumstances resis-
tance to the king was a sin which would bring damnation.-
As society became more diverse and extensive, the English kings
13. Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, Four Theories of the Press 44-51 (1956).
14. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings 38-65 (2d ed. 1922).
15. Id. at 19.
16. Scott, Twilight of the King (1938).
17. Figgis, op. cit. supra note 14, at 15.
18. Id. at 6.
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found it necesary to have their kingly governmental powers exercised
by representatives. The courts, then, of early England acted for the
king throughout the realm. And their exercise of contempt powers
derived from a presumed contempt of the king's authority.' Violation
of their writ, or disobedience to their officers, violated the peace and
flouted the king they represented. The contempt power of the equity
courts had a similar origin. The equity Chancellor dispensed justice in
the place of the king, and his orders obtained their validity because of
the use of the Great Seal, disobedience of which was considered a
grievous contempt of the king.2 This engraftment, from a power of
the courts as adjuncts of the king to one inherent in the courts them-
selves, was described in the decision of an Irish judge in 1813.21 The
process of attachment, he reported, was one used by the judges of the
Aula Regis, by which those who interfered with the king's peace were
brought before the court and punished. Derived from Norman law,
it was resorted to "because disobedience of their orders was a con-
tempt of the King himself whose ministers they were.... By the Nor-
man law it was established that nothing could be done but by the
King's writ. '22 So, the origin of attachments was from this preroga-
tive process derived from a presumed contempt of the king's author-
ity. Under the Norman kings, an offender's personal property was
forfeited to the king's mercy. Later, this was changed to a fine, which
in turn was later refined into a procedure whereby the offender was
imprisoned until the fine was paid.23 This is akin to the current prac-
tices with contempt. For civil contempt, the offender is imprisoned
until he purges his act of contempt. Originally, contempt of Congress
was used merely to coerce cooperation, at which time the imprison-
ment ended. For criminal contempt, the offender of today may be
fined, imprisoned, or both, and non-conditionally.
Gradually, any questions about the right of the judiciary to punish
disobedience, obstruction, or disrespect (and they were few) were
answered with the claim that this was an inherent right of English
courts. Necessity then became with maturity the mother of this
claimed innate, natural right of courts. The natural inclination to
claim this power as one innate in judicial institutions was but one step
19. Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 161 (1908).
20. Langdell, Summary of Equity Pleading 38 (1877).
21. Fox, The King v. Almon, 24 L.Q. Rev. 184, 194 (1908). The decision
referred to is that by Fletcher, J., in Taaffe v. Downes which is out of print, but
reported in 24 L.Q. Rev. 194 (1908).
22. Fox, supra note 21, at 195.
23. Fox, The Summary Process to Punish Contempt, 25 L.Q. Rev. 238, 241
(1909).
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in the rise in power of the courts, and later tile Parliament, in Eng-
land. The King had pointed the way.
The roots of English law, from which the contemporary contempt
doctrine sprouts, are thin but deep in history. Sir John Fox trod
through the complex and voluminous writings appropriate to this
subject, and presented his results in a series of articles in the Law
Quarterly Reviews of 1908, 1909, 1920, 1921, 1922 and 1924.2
Citing Pollock and Maitland, he probed the histories of English law to
find that contempt was extant as far back as the 10th century in Eng-
land.23 The theory then offered for its being was that the law became
irritated by contumacy, and instead of saying to the contumnor "I
don't care," it set its will against his will, and ordered him. This
theory was rationalized in Bracton's De Legibus on the ground that
there is no greater crime than contempt because all within the realm
ought to obey the King and be part of his peace. 8 Here we see the
true assumption by courts of a power originally based upon their pe-
culiar position as adjuncts to the King, and administrators of his will.
This is a characteristic no longer prevalent in England, and never
accepted in America. Yet, this assumption seeped into a court frame-
of-reference, and has welled and risen, not as a force rooted in kingly
relations, but as a necessary, and inherent, characteristic of courts
independently. He wrote:
Thus from the earliest laws of the kingdom, through the records
of the Curia Regis and the Parliament, the Year Books, and the
first treatises on law, the development of "contempt" in the legal
sense can be traced until by the fourteenth century the principles
upon which punishment is inflicted to restrain disobedience to the
commands of the King and his courts as well as other acts which
tend to obstruct the course of justice, have become firmly estab-
lished.27
Paring the facts from the legend, Sir John further particularized that
the idea that every contempt of court was considered indirectly a con-
tempt of the King is corroborated even by the wording of the writ
applied in contempt cases. It read that a contempt had been "com-
mitted against us"-us being the court and its King. More particular-
ization would border on the picayune.
24. Fox, Eccentricities of the Law of Contempt of Court, 36 L.Q. Rev. 394
(1920) ; Fox, The King v. Almon, 24 L.Q. Rev. 184, 266 (1908) ; Fox, The Nature
of Contempt of Court, 37 L.Q. Rev. 191 (1921); Fox, The Practice in Contempt
of Court Cases, 38 L.Q. Rev. 185 (1922); Fox, The Summary Process to Punish
Contempt, 25 L.Q. Rev. 238, 354 (1909); Fox, The Writ of Attachment, 40 L.Q.
Rev. 43 (1924). See also Fox, Contempt of Court (1927).
25. Fox, The Nature of Contempt of Court, 37 L.Q. Rev. 191, 194 (1921).
26. Id. at 195.
27. Id. at 20L
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In the 13th century, contempt action was taken for such acts as
default or misfeasance of parties, assaults and disturbances in court,
insults to judges and misconduct by officers of the law. However, in
all of the cases reported, contempt was treated procedurally "in the
ordinary course of the law.' 28 Summary punishment was meted out
only where the accused person confessed his guilt. Then a jury trial
was unnecessary. Further collating the cases, he reported that until
the 15th century innumerable contempts "which would have been dealt
with by summary process in the 18th century were being tried ... in
the ordinary course of law." 29 A Scottish jurist traced the cases up to
the time of Henry V, and concluded that criminal contempt cases in
the King's Bench until that time were dealt with by procedures not
summary.30 With the Star Chamber came non-jury procedures, and
the treatment of contempt by interrogatories of the court. This latter
procedure was cited by Justice Wilmot in the Almon case as the nub of
due process, far better than capricious juries. Yet with the abolition
of the Star Chamber,3 1 it was legislated that all matters theretofore
handled by that court would be treated "by the common law of the
land and in the ordinary course of justice ... ."3 Summary process
was exercised to enforce the King's writs or to preserve discipline
among the officers of the court. The summary procedures in these
cases were deemed appropriate because of their immediacy and physi-
cal relation to the courts. It was said that such misconduct must be
summarily punished by courts because without this power of compul-
sion they could not perform, and the kingdom would stand still if
"justice" was not immediate-and of course, custom and necessity
called for it. Other contempts were punishable, but only in the ordi-
nary non-summary course of the law. It was not until the time of
Blackstone and the 18th century writers that contempt was summarily
punished, without question as to where it was committed. Before
then, those contempts which were summarily punished were com-
mitted in the face of the court (in facie curiae). The very view of
the court was considered to supply the conviction. 33
Blackstone was a friend of Justice Wilmot, the author of the Almon
case; and an analysis of this case explains the sudden change in the
then current law of contempt, and its impact on the future. The legal
status of contempt of court was given not only enunciation, but also
28. Id. at 199.
29. Fox, supra note 23, at 244.
30. Solly-Flood, The Story of Prince Henry of Monmouth and Chief-Justice
Gascoigne, Transactions of the Royal Hist. Society 47 (1886).
31. The Habeas Corpus Act, 1640, 16 Car. 1, c. 10.
32. Fox, The King v. Almon 24 L.Q. Rev. 266, 273 (1908).
33. Stroudis' Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 267 (1629).
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an authoritative and pervasive application in this much criticized, but
more quoted, decision which, though decided in 1764, was not pub-
lished except posthumously in the notes of Justice Wilmot, the author
of the opinion, in 1802.34 Before this case, it was accepted that orders
of a court were not to be disobeyed, and that acts hindering the ad-
ministration of justice were punishable. Statutes were extant which
allowed private redress for the scandalizing of governmental figures--
scandalum magnatum35 But Justice Wilmot, in Rex v. Almon, ex-
tended the then contemporary contempt doctrine, and gave the world
an opinion full of dicta which was later seized upon, requoted, and
made sacrosanct, until years later when discerning scholars found
and pointed out his error.3 6 His doctrine now lives, a venerable prod-
uct of stare decisis and years of acceptance, though somewhat limp
from recent criticism.
Almon was a bookseller who was tried in 1765 for publishing an
alleged libel about Lord Mansfield. Justice Wilmot, who wrote an
opinion which held Almon in contempt for the article, had been ele-
vated to his position by a Cabinet which was under the strong influ-
ence of Lord Mansfield. It is reported that he deemed criticism of the
Lord as bordering on sacrilege.3 7 One of the charges Almon had made
against Lord Mansfield related to a court action involving a person
named Wilkes. When Justice Wilmot's judgment granting an attach-
ment against Almon was about to be delivered, it was discovered that
it referred, by some error or confusion, to The King v. Wilkes, instead
of The King v. Almon. Then, it has been written: "Mr. Justice Wilmot
urged the defendant's counsel, Sergeant Glynn, 'as a gentleman' to
consent to an amendment, to which Sergeant replied that as 'a
man of honor' he could not."38
The action was abandoned and the opinion was never delivered. In
1802, Justice Wilmot's son published the notes of his father which in-
cluded the still-born, misnomered opinion, The King v. Wilkes.39 In
this opinion was the language which has been so controversially re-
ferred to ever since:
The power which the courts in Westminster Hall have of vindi-
cating their own authority is coeval with their first foundation
and institution; it is a necessary incident to every court of justice,
whether of record or not, to fine and imprison for a contempt to
34. Wilmot's Notes (Wilmot ed. 1802).
35. Oswald, Contempt of Court (3d ed. 1910).
36. Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal
Contempt in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37
Harv. L. Rev. 1010 (1924).
37. Fox, The King v. Almon, 24 L.Q. Rev. 184 (1908).
38. Fox, Contempt of Court 1 (1927).
39. Id. at 5-6.
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the court, acted in the face of it, I Ventris I, and the issuing
attachments by the supreme courts of justice in Westminster
Hall for contempts out of court stands upon the same immemorial
usage as supports the whole fabric of the common law; it is as
much the lex terrae and within the exception of Magna Charta
as the issuing [sic] any other legal process whatsoever. I have
examined very carefully to see if I could find out any vestiges or
traces of its introduction but can find none. It is as ancient as any
other part of the common law; there is no priority or posterior-
ity to be discovered about it and therefore (it) cannot be said to
invade the common law, but to act in an alliance and friendly
conjunction with every other provision which the wisdom of our
ancestors has established for the general good of society. And
though I do not mean to compare and contrast attachments with
trial by jury, yet truth compels me to say that the mode of pro-
ceeding by attachment stands upon the very same foundation and
basis as trial by juries do-immemorial usage and practice.40
Sir John Fox, in his classic treatise on the -subject, has pointed out
that though the early common law deemed disobedience to the king's
writ a contempt, and the courts eventually used the king's seal to make
their process effective, what started out as contempt of the Lord of
the court became contempt of the administration of justice instead,
when the Almon case extended concepts of contempt as it did. He
pointed out that the summary power to punish, which Justice Wilmot
condoned, was beyond the embrace of previous contempt practice.
It had been suggested that the power to commit for contempt derived
from a statute which empowered sheriffs to commit persons %vho re-
sisted their process.4'1 But this was after trial in the customary
fashion. Justice Wilmot reasoned "that if resistance to a minister of
the court is punishable" in this way, "a fortiori libelling a judge in his
judicial capacity is so punishable." Rationalizing the power of judi-
cial contempt as a product of the divine right of kings, Sir John Fox
report s Wilmot's reasoning thusly:
[B] y our constitution the King is the fountain of justice and...
he delegates the power to the Judges ... arraignment of the jus-
tice of the Judges is arraigning the King's justice; .. . it is an
impeachment of his wisdom in the choice of his Judges; . . . it
excites dissatisfaction with judicial determinations and indisposes
the minds of people to obey them; . . . this is a most fatal ob-
struction of justice, and calls for a more immediate redress than
any other....42
40. Wilmot's Notes 254, (Wilmot ed. 1802), as cited in Fox, Contempt of
Court 7-8 (1927). (Emphasis added.)
41. Fox, op. cit. supra note 38, at 8-9, citing for opposing argument, Chief
Baron Gilbert, History of the Common Pleas 20 (1737), where this summary
power was traced to the Statute of Westminister II, c. 39, noting however that
after attachment the trial was in the ordinary course of law.
42. Wilmot's Notes 255 (Wilmot ed. 1802), as cited in Fox, Contempt of
Court 9 (1927).
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His dream was to keep a blaze of glory around the court, that it
would never be contemptible in the eyes of the public.
Justice Wilmot's proof of the supreme fairness of this contempt pro-
cedure lay in his reasoning that in the summary procedure before the
court the party could acquit himself by his own oath, whereas a jury
might improperly convict him upon false evidence. Such logic, by its
mere specious statement, lacks convincing certitude.
The analysis of the Almon case is as long and complicated as it is
interesting. Suffice it to note the circumstances, that one may evalu-
ate its influence upon the articulation of the law of contempt of court,
as well as the propriety of its departure from previous confines of the
power.
For years, the situation remained static. Until the nineteenth cen-
tury there were only two other cases of contempt of the court which
arose out of the courts, and which were treated by summary pro-
cedures.4 3 Interestingly, both involved libels of Lord Mansfield. How-
ever, in writing his famous legal treatise, Blackstone consulted his
friend Justice Wilmot concerning the law of contempt. He reported
then that the law was such as Wilmot had reasoned, but cited no
authorities to support the conclusion. So, it has been accurately con-
cluded:
The present law of contempt in this country has been founded...
upon the statements of Blackstone in his Commentaries and Sir
John Eardley-Wilmot in King v. Almon which concerned a con-
tempt by publication. Oddly enough, neither of these authorities
forms a legal precedent, for the opinion of Justice ... Wilmot
was never delivered, as the case was dismissed because of techni-
cal difficulties. It also appears that in all probability the state-
ments made by Blackstone merely represented the views of Judge
Wilmot, and that it may be said that the present scope of the sum-
mary power is due almost exclusively to the opinion of one man.4"
By the twentieth century, the law of Wilmot had, like fine wine, aged
to the point of unquestioning respect. English courts adopted the Al-
mon decision, cited it, and extended it beyond even Wilmot's probable
intent.
The sometimes blind inheritance of common law in American legal
attitudes bore this Almon-phenomenon of England to the United
States, where it was early inculcated as a rule of law. The sanctity
given by Blackstone's approval of Justice Wilmot's opinion added to
its prestige in the United States. Since the American colonists were by
and large a product of the common law environment of England, it
was natural that their courts were endowed with procedures copied
from mother England. Though these settlers consciously went about
43. Fox, Contempt of Court 16 (1927).
44. Thomas, Problems of Contempt of Court 5 (1934).
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ameliorating many of the harsher aspects of English governmental
practice, the general contempt of court power was not amongst the
changes. This was probably due to the minor civil implications of the
exercise of this power at that time, and the seemingly natural claim
for the power by the courts themselves.
The first American federal legislation dealing with the contempt of
court power was the Judiciary Act of 1789, which by its words gave
federal courts "the power. . . to punish by fine or imprisonment, at
the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any case or
hearing before same.... ."-I Impliedly, this included whatever the ex-
tent of the power of contempt of court was at common law. The first
state legislation in America was passed in Pennsylvania, and it con-
demned as contempt official misconduct of court officers, disobedience
to process, and misbehavior in the presence of the court." (This ex-
cluded the vicarious kind of constructive contempt to the administra-
tion of justice which was approved by Justice Wilmot in the Almon
case.) New York followed with similar legislation which was finally
passed in 1829, also excluding the contempt, Almon-Wilmot species,
but accepting without question the power of contempt of court in gen-
eral.4'7 The courts considered that the right to punish for contempt was
one adopted from long precedent and essential to judicial efficiency.
These statutes were followed in theme and extent by federal legisla-
tion in 1821, which aimed at alleviating both the uncertainties and the
harshness of the original federal rule. This change was provoked by
a heated controversy which arose out of the famous Peck impeachment
case.
Until then, there were only a few federal cases in the lower federal
courts arising under the 1789 statute, and they followed the common
law rule with respect to constructive contempts. 48 There was no ques-
tion that the exercise by courts of the direct contempt power (disobe-
dience -to process, or disrespect in the presence of the courts) was in-
herent, and proper. Then, Lawless, an attorney from Missouri, pro-
voked Congress into initiating impeachment proceedings against
Judge Peck for willful oppression. Peck was a federal judge who pun-
ished Lawless summarily under his assumed contempt power, for
publishing a critical article about his conduct of a series of pending
proceedings, which concerned the adjudication of land grants from the
old Spanish-American authorities, and in which the Judge had ruled
45. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 17, 1 Stat. 83.
46. Pa. Acts 1809, P.L. 146, 5 Sm. L. 55.
47. N.Y. Rev. Stat. c. 3, § 10 (1829).
48. Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 Colum.
L. Rev. 410, 422-23 (1928).
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unfavorably to the interests of Lawless.-9 Congressional hearings
lasted almost a year, when the Judge was finally acquitted by a vote
of 22-21. One of the arguments made at these hearings was that the
power of judicial contempt was not inherent but a product of the
common law; ergo since Almon's case was not common law (it never
having been officially published), its effect was void. The Judge
claimed innocent and fair interpretation of the common law power of
contempt of court, basing his conclusions upon the English decisions
that preceded his50 Yet the strong feelings about freedom of the press
at the time of the Peck debates precipitated against this oppressive
judicial power. One month after Judge Peck's acquittal, later-to-be-
come President Buchanan, then Chairman of the Judiciary Committee
and active in the impeachment debates, presented a bill to Congress
which followed the New York-Pennsylvania trend and omitted sum-
mary contempt power in cases where the act was not obstructive of
the physical administration of justice. It was passed in 1831,51 and
covered misbehavior in the presence of the court or so near thereto
as to obstruct the administration of justice, disobedience of process,
and discipline of court officers. By 1860, 23 of the then 33 states had
enacted legislation implementing the federal policy concerning con-
structive contempts, and only a few states applied the rule of Almo's
case. The current federal statute reads much the same as the 1831
statute,52 though the Supreme Court cases have varied at different
times in their interpretations of it, and are currently closely split as
to allegiance to or departure from the English rule, the latter group
currently prevailing. The rule has since pendulated both in the federal
and state courts with respect to the interpretation of the statutes
coverage of the constructive contempt power. This treatment will be
thoroughly detailed in a later chapter.
When intrepid souls have dared to question the right of the courts'
mighty contempt power, and at times in prefatory apologias to their
decisions, judges have proffered several pat raisons d'etre. One ration-
ale has been necessity.53 Without such a power, what would deter
obstruction to the administration of justice? Would courts be merely
49. This incident is thoroughly and urbanely discussed by Nelles & King, supra
note 48, at 423-30.
50. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 36, at 1025.
51. Rev. Stat. § 725 (1875), 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1948).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 401 defines the power of the United States courts as covering
misbehavior of court officers in their official transactions, disobedience of writs,
and misbehavior of anyone in the court's presence or so near thereto as to obstruct
the administration of justice.
53. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911); cases
cited in 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 43 nn. 76-77 (1939); 1 Kent, Commentaries 236
(2d ed. 1882).
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impotent boards of arbitration without any control or effect?' This
is not necessarily a matter of speculative conjecture. Our Supreme
Court has never exercised the contempt power, and it has been as
effective, powerful, and dignified a court as one could ever hope for.
Is this not an example of respect and efficacy predicated upon and re-
sulting from qualities and powers more ideally suited to a democratic
society than coercive contempt powers? And what of other countries
which do not have similar powers, or which have them only in limited
and circumscribed instances? Is justice chaotic elsewhere than in
America? And is it so necessary for control and order to have such a
power as contempt? Do courts not have other disciplinary and puni-
tive sanctions equally effective, yet better procedurally dedicated to
an ordered liberty? We will see in later chapters that they do, and
that the contempt power is not the only moat to separate the crass or
mundane public from the majestic castle of the judiciary.
Another rationale, or the same one reduced one level, is expediency 5
and self-protection." And expedient it unquestionably is. But is expe-
dience a good reason in the face of injustice, and is this not another
way of saying it is necessary-more euphemistic, though intellectually
equally unsatisfactory?
And the same necessity argument, elevated one level, has been
offered in the name of inherence.5 T Most cases, in fact, have considered
it axiomatic that the power of contempt is inherent in coarts, and
automatically exists by its very nature. This is easier to say than to
disprove. However, the contempt power has been uniformly reserved
to superior courts both in England and the United States."B If the
power is inherent in courts, how can it be that some courts are with-
out it? This anomaly of reason, especially if supplemented by the his-
torical inconsistencies supporting the reasons for courts' contempt
powers, weakens the claim that the power is innate in judicial bodies.
All of these reasons seem no more than rationalizations which can-
not withstand the insights of critical evaluation, or historical consis-
tency.
However, the general power of courts to punish for contempt was
little questioned during these early days in the United States. In one
reported case, Justice Field of the Supreme Court wrote that:
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its
existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial pro-
54. The Supreme Court prophesied that this would happen in Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra note 53.
55. 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 43 nn. 75-77 (1939).
56. 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 43 & n. 72 (1939).
57. See Note, 11 Va. L. Rev. 639 (1925), which questions the necessity rationale.
58. Oswald, op. cit. supra note 35, at 8; Rapalje, Contempt § 4 (1890).
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ceedings, and to the.., due administration of justice. The mo-
ment the courts of the United States were called into existence
and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became
possessed of this power (contempt of court).2
Whether it was deemed beyond dispute, or so natural and necessary
as to be without question, or whether the arguments about the exten-
sion of the power (in constructive contempt cases) shifted the focus
of legal opposition away from the attack upon the general power itself
and concentrated against its specific extension, is open to conjecture.
Yet it has been said, and repeated of late, that the power of contempt
itself "is, perhaps, nearest akin to despotic power of any power ex-
isting under our form of government."' o Justice Black, less impressed
by 170 years of Almon precedent, has written about the contempt
power that "the principle commonly referred to as stare decisis has
never been thought to extend so far as to prevent courts from cor-
recting their own errors."61 Yet even the vigorous critics of the sum-
mary contempt power, who have recently sounded the call for change,
impliedly go along with maintaining at least some contempt power for
the courts.
Legal scholars have more recently, and after thorough historical
study, raised serious doubts about Justice Wilmot's conclusions.
Messrs. Frankfurter and Landis have written about the implications
of the Almon case, that:
It has bedeviled the law of contempt both in England and this
country ever since. Wilmot's opinion influenced the course of
decisions during the nineteenth century, partly because he spoke
with an air of great authority, and partly because the power
which he claimed is not unappealing even to high-minded judges
bent upon the quick dispatch of business.62
As late as 1958, Justice Black is recorded as having said that "the
myth of immemorial usage has been exploded by recent scholarship as
a mere fiction," but that the decision in the Almon case has "never-
theless exerted a baleful influence on the law of contempt both in this
country and in England."' 3 Nevertheless, Wilmot's "immemorial
usage" became our law of the land, and the exercise of the contempt
power in general now occupies so embedded a position of acceptance
that, though modification in light of contemporary legal and govern-
mental interests is possible, change will be difficult to bring about,
59. Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873).
60. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Circuit Court, 97 Wis. 1, 8, 72 N.W. 193,
194-95 (1897).
61. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 195 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
62. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 36, at 1047.
63. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 202, 203 (1958).
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and revocation of the practice nigh-impossible. The law of contempt
of court is very much with us today. Every state court has author-
izedly acted against contempts; all federal courts, except the Supreme
Court, have equally done so; and with the increasing business in the
courts and the not occasional employment of the courtrooms as arenas
for political, as well as private legal disputes, the use of this contempt
power has caused far-reaching ripples in the pond of social conse-
quence.
I. CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS
As the American power of judicial contempt is the product of the
transplantation of English common law (whether with good reason
or not), so the use of the contempt power by our Congress harkens
back to Anglican beginnings. But though the historical arena was the
same, the participating power forces which provoked, and the path of
precedent which led to its acceptance, were not. Nor was the unques-
tioning readiness with which the American legal climate accepted
contempt of court concepts, the environment into which it was to be
planted, though the future was to see the doctrine flourish.
As with contempt of court, the rationale for punishing contempt of
legislative bodies was a carry-over from days of divine and kingly
rule. The king could not only do no wrong; he would not tolerate
being questioned or impeded, much less flouted or insulted. 68 The at-
titude of political subservience by individuals to government was
inculcated into popular perspectives of state relationships. And as
critics of the king were punished and pilloried, so were critics of the
courts, original administrators of the King's will. But the Parliament
was not always in the powerful and prestigious position it occupies
today. Nor was it so much a collaborative power of the royalty as
were the courts. In fact, the Parliament rose as a popular govern-
mental representative body only after years of power struggle in Eng-
land with the King, and its position in government has, at least peri-
odically, been one of antagonism toward the King and kingly pow-
ers.85
American courts, and American legal historians, have often referred
to the history of the English Parliament in support of their theories
about contemporary congressional contempt powers. 68 The frequency
of their resort has been almost equaled by the variety of their conclu-
sions. The fact that secondary sources are all that can be resorted to
64. See 2 Tenn. L. Rev. 215 (1924).
65. See generally Jane, The Coming of Parliament (1905); McIlwain, High
Court of Parliament (1910).
66. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168 (1880); Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt,
74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 691 (1926).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss1/6
CONTEMPT POWER
in resolving some of these academic arguments compounds both the
variety and the intensity of these differences. However, proponents of
our congressional contempt power agree in pointing to the parliamen-
tary exercise of the power as the authoritative example of its use by
legislative bodies. The arguments arise about the historical nature of
the Parliament's power. Concededly, Parliament was once, long ago,
a body which discharged both judicial and legislative functions. It
was the high court of Parliament, a body of bishops, lords, knights,
and burgesses who "exercised the highest functions of a court of judi-
cature, repre.nting in that respect the judicial authority of the king.
S.."61 As such, they rendered judgments, as well as enacting laws.
When this organization was changed, and the Parliament more akin
to what we recognize structurally today was created, the original body
divided into the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The lat-
ter group continued to exercise appellate judicial functions, while the
former was made a legislative branch, with only a very limited number
of judicial powers. It has been considered that this original judicial
capacity, which the House of Commons once had, supplied the true
grounds for its exercise of the contempt power forevermore. At least,
since disputes with the judicial contempt power were few, this was
both an expedient argument, and one which followed with perfect
logical, if not syllogistic, reasoning. Courts can punish for contempts,
as kings could, and Parliament was once a court, so it too cannot be
precluded from exercising the power, though now the House of Com-
mons is a legislative body.
Other defenders of the legislative contempt power, while agreeing
that the power exists, see it founded for far different reasons, and
criticize the conclusion that it all goes back to days of kings and
courts."1 One legal historian critized the view that the English legis-
lature's contempt power derived from its judicial days, and pointed out
that "the first instance in which the House of Commons vindicated any
power of privilege by imprisoning for contempt occurred in 1543,
nearly three hundred years after the Commons had become a separate
body." 9 Indeed, English historians themselves have reported different
attitudes within the House of Commons as to its one-time judicial
power.1 0 The point which these men failed to consider in their search
for mathematical, historic logic is that even though the cases which
interpreted the power of the House of Commons to punish for con-
tempt arose after the merger into the present Parliament and the
abdication of its phantasmal judicial power, it is not clear whether the
67. Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra note 66, at 183.
68. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 129 (1935).
69. Potts, supra note 66, at 697.
70. Id. at 694.
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power was upheld on the basis of legislative necessity, usage, or be-
cause of the analogy with the former judicial character of the House.
There is as much reason to believe that the courts which upheld the
power of legislative contempt did so on the theory that the House once
had that former judicial capacity, than as not. In other words, though
the cases arose after the House of Commons concededly lost its judi-
cial character, the cases may well have been decided with that origi-
nal capacity in mind. There is legal language which leads to this
conclusion. Thus, the use of contempt by the legislature would be a
carry-over from days when it was a judicial body. This point is no-
where satisfactorily answered.
Another rationale claimed for the exercise of this power by the
Congress, and the courts as well, has been necessity.72 The cases often
have reasoned that without such a power, the legislative body could
not function. The power of the legislature was said to be governed by
the same principles as was that of the judiciary. In other cases this
necessity has been labelled self-defense.72 Without the power to punish
contempt, there would be no way to deter disrespect, or encourage co-
operation. Still another ground urged in defense of the exercise of the
contempt power has been expedience. 7 This is, if more euphemistic,
less than satisfying intellectually; and essentially no more than an-
other way of saying it is necessary.
This necessity argument has also circuitously been developed into
one of inherency.74 Certain cases have advanced the argument that
the power of contempt is not only expedient, and necessary, but is also
so essential that it must be a natural, innate power of any legislature.
I suggest that all of these arguments, necessity, expediency, inherency
-are but full circle around the same ground. The courts have, to one
degree or another, recognized that the power is helpful to the comple-
tion of legislative tasks. And this it certainly is. To acknowledge the
loud claims for the power by legislatures, courts have been wont to
articulate some rationalization for its condonation. But other than
this merry circle of need-usefulness-natural, there has been an un-
71. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935); Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204
(1821); I Kent, Commentaries 236 (2d ed. 1832).
72. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).
73. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 226 (1821).
74. The language that the contempt power is an inherent one, both of courts
and Congress, seeped into rationales either through loose language, or a subtle
extension of accepted doctrine. It followed naturally from rationales of expedi-
ency, then necessity. See, e.g., Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160-61
(1955); McGrain v. Dougherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927); In re Chapman, 166
U.S. 661, 671-72 (1897); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873); Anderson
v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 232 (1821).
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satisfactory explanation of the purpose and value of legislative con-
tempt powers in these cases. The trouble here is compounded by the
realization that most instances of what is now treated as contempt are
usually covered by other legal sanctions, without the use of summary
procedures. This will be discussed more thoroughly in later chapters.
In any event, the Parliament emerged as a powerful legislature dur-
ing the end of the seventeenth century, and to insure its position,
claimed and exercised the privileges and procedures thought befitting
of its post, among which was the summary contempt* power.7 5 Here
again, historical origins played only a convenient part in the adoption
of the contempt power by Parliament. Undoubtedly, this institution,
in its ascendency to power, realized the effectiveness of such a tool,
and adopted it only coincidentally noting their atavistic judicial na-
ture.
The original American colonies adopted many procedures akin to
the motherland's common law methods. Their assemblies exercised the
contempt power in defense of privilege, to compel testimony, and to
protect their dignity and position.-' The cases were many, and though
their reasoning was not often questioned, they rationalized their power
as one of inherent and necessary right-auxiliary to their legislative
natures." What was claimed to be inherent in the courts, also became
inherent in the legislature.78 Strangely, only a few states included this
right in their constitutions. Defenders of the right of the legislature
to punish for contempt attribute this silence to its supposed axio-
matic, or inferred implication within the grant of legislative powers
in general.7 '
The federal constitution is also silent with respect to the power of
Congress to punish non-members for contempt. It has been reported
that "A proposal at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 to incor-
porate an explicit grant to the Congress for the exercise of these
powers [to conduct investigations and punish for contempt] died in
the meetings of the committee on style."-0 The reverse argument was
made by critics of the congressional contempt power in response to
this silence; that is, since it was not granted, while other specific puni-
tive powers were,8 ' the intent, they claimed, was to deny the power.8 2
For some time, the exercise of the power by the legislature went un-
75. Beck, Contempt of Congress 2 (1959).
76. Ibid.
77. See Potts, supra note 66, at 700-12.
78. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935).
79. Potts, supra note 66.
80. Beck, op. cit. supra note 75, at 3.
81. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5.
82. Burnham v. Morrissey, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 226 (1859).
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questioned, a situation which has been construed as popular, silent
acquiescence, and evidence, of a sort, of its propriety.83 By congres-
sional action, then, the problem was resolved, though after much de-
bate within the Congress about whether or not it could cite for con-
tempt. In 1795, a House committee investigating an alleged bribery
of a member of the House cited one Randall, a non-member, for con-
tempt and imprisoned him for nine days.8' This was the first recorded
instance of congressional contempt by a non-member for violating the
dignity of the legislature in America. During the next fifty years, both
the House and the Senate cited individuals for contempt of their au-
gust selves. Though the procedures were summary, all who were cited
were given the opportunity to present a defense and to be represented,
to a limited extent, by counsel.
Finally, in 1821, the first American case to discuss the power of the
legislature to punish for contempt was decided. An examination of
this case, and another early decision of the United States Supreme
Court, will illustrate the political misgivings toward application of the
English contempt rule to Congress, as well as the reasons advanced in
support of adopting this legislative power, which prevailed at that
time.
The case, Anderson v. Dunn,8 5 arose out of an order by the then
Speaker of the House, Henry Clay, to the Clerk, and thence to the
Sergeant-at-Arms of the House, Dunn, "to take into custody the body
of the said John [Anderson], wherever to be found, and the same
forthwith to have before the said House, at the bar thereof, then and
there to answer the said charge .... "86 This was done. Anderson was
charged with abuse of the Hduse and contempt of its dignity. The
particular nature of his offense is not clear from the report of the de-
cision, though a later opinion, based upon inference from the record,
stated that the delinquency was an attempt to bribe a member of the
House 8' It has been reported that Anderson sent Lewis, a member of
the House, $500 for any "extra trouble" gone to in furtherance of a
claim in which Anderson was interested.88 The House, in debate, de-
cided that it had the contempt power irrespective of any constitu-
tional provision, in order to protect itself and to operate efficiently.
After being taken into custody, Anderson was brought before the
House and allowed to present a defense to the charges of misconduct
against him. The House was adjourned each day, and Anderson was
83. Potts, supra note 66, at 713.
84. Beck, op. cit. supra note 75, at 19L
85. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
86. Id. at 208.
87. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 196 (1880).
88. Beck, op. cit. supra note "75, at 4.
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kept in custody during the adjournments, until the matter was finally
closed, and he was judged guilty, reprimanded, and discharged from
custody. Later, Anderson sued Dunn in trespass for assault and bat-
tery and false imprisonment. Dunn's defense was the warrant by,
and the authority of, Congress. There was little American authority
to guide the Supreme Court, and both parties argued in consideration
of the English practice, and the more settled theory of contempt of
court. The Attorney General argued for the government that the
power of Congress to punish contempts is a "principle of universal law
growing out of the natural right of self-defence belonging to all per-
sons," and that the "necessity of self-defence is as incidental to legis-
lative, as to judicial authority."8' Counsel for Anderson argued that
whatever powers, akin to contempt, which Congress had, were inap-
plicable to Anderson, who was not an official of Congress. Their argu-
ment was that article I, section 5 of the Constitution gave Congress the
power to determine its own rules of procedure within its walls and
over its members. This implied the power to punish its deliquent mem-
ber,-% if necessary. However, the power to punish "relates solely to the
internal polity and economy of the House," and not to non-members
like Anderson.
Supreme Court Justice Johnson affirmed the lower federal court's
approval of Dunn's defense. His opinion included a philosophical dis-
cussion of the power of Congress, of facile erudition but less than sat-
isfying reason.
First, the court reasoned that if Congress had no powe.r to punish
Anderson it had no power to compel his appearance, because the lat-
ter is an initiating process issued in the assertion of the former (pun-
ishing power). It followed by agreeing that there was no express con-
gressional power to punish except over its own members. Conse-
quently, if the power existed to punish non-members, it was one to be
implied, though "the genius and spirit of our institutions are hostile
to the exercise of implied powers."' 0
Leaving the genius and spirit of our institutions, Justice Johnson
then verbally embarked upon a social compact theory, and wrote that
power, properly delegated and responsibly exercised, is for the good
of all, as it is for the governmental body exercising that power. With
this point made, he skipped to the power of contempt of court, about
which he said:
Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by
their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and
decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful man-
89. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 219 (1821).
90. Id. at 225.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
dates, and, as a corollary to this proposition, to preserve them-
selves and their officers from the approach and insults of
pollution."
Enforced with this principle, he next switched to and displayed his
supreme faith in the ideal of the legislature, thusly:
That a deliberate assembly, clothed with the majesty of the
people, and charged with the care of all that is dear to them;
composed of the most distinguished citizens, selected and drawn
together from every quarter of a great nation; whose delibera-
tions are required by public opinion to be conducted under the eye
of the public, and whose decisions must be clothed with all that
sanctity which unlimited confidence in their wisdom and purity
can inspire; that such an assembly should not possess the power
to suppress rudeness, or repel insult, is a supposition too wild
to be suggested.92
The decision continued with a discussion of the fact that the offense
by Anderson was committed in the House and was, therefore, within
the express powers of Congress, and that the commitment was limited
because "the existence of the power that imprisons is indispensable to
its continuance; and although the lgislative power continues per-
petual, the legislative body ceases to exist on the moment of its
adjournment or periodical dissolution." 93 Thus, the principle arose
that imprisonment for contempt of Congress terminates upon ad-
journment of that body.
With an admission that American legislative bodies do not have the
omnipotence of the English legislative assembly (the only true prece-
dent for the authority of Con ress to punish for contempt, and, it
could be argued, a fatal concession), a plea for moral self-restraint by
the legislators in whose hands he had placed this power, and a paternal
epilogue--"respectful deportment. . . will render all apprehension
chimerical, '"-9 the first American case was concluded. The power of
congressional contempt was upheld, upon reasons that the future
would extend, and ideals it would ignore.
In 1874, the contempt power of Congress was again questioned, 3
under circumstances similiar to those in Anderson v. Dunn. The
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia folloived the Dunn decision,
and ruled that the power to commit for contempt existed in Congress,
and so long as the Speaker of the House has jurisdiction over the
premises, his ministerial function of committal was proper. The
91. Id. at 227.
92. Id. at 228.
93. Id. at 231.
94. Id. at 235.
95. Stewart v. Blaine, 8 D.C. (1 MacArth.) 453 (1874).
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decision was brief, and relied upon stare decisis,"e not questioning
the reason or authority of Justice Johnson. In deference to the
decision in Dunn, the court wrote that the issue had been decided after
"stout contest and upon thorough deliberation,""s and should have the
respect of half a century of undisturbed age.
However, this situation was soon changed by the decision of Justice
Miller in Kilbourn v. Thompson.- There, the United States Supreme
Court was called upon to review a lower federal court ruling which
dismissed an action by Kilbourn on the same grounds as in Anderson
v. Dunn.
The United States government had been a creditor of a company
which was in the midst of bankruptcy proceedings. After a legislative
investigating committee was appointed to inquire into the matter of
the government's interest, the committee called Kilbourn and sub-
poenaed certain documents in his possession. He refused to answer
certain questions, or to produce the documents, for which he was
imprisoned in the District of Columbia jail. On his release after
bringing habeas corpus proceedings, a plea of justification was made
by the Sergeant-at-Arms, on the basis of his Congressional authority.
The Supreme Court upheld Kilbourn, and he later recovered $20,000.
In curtailing the punishing power of Congress, the court relied on
the separation-of-powers doctrine, and pointed out that except in
limited instances, where Congress was expressly given the power to
punish by the Constitution, its exercise of such a power was an im-
proper asumption of judicial functions.
In support of this conclusion, the court traced the history of con-
tempt of the English Parliament, pointing out what it considered to
be the misconceived impressions expressed in the Dunn case, and the
correct source of the legislative contempt power.
Noting in his opinion that analogy with the English legislature and
its practice" failed because of its hybrid history of judicial as well as
legislative powers, Justice Miller wrote:
[T]he powers and privileges of the House of Commons of Eng-
land, on the subject of punishment for contempts, rests on
principles which have no application to other legislative bodies,
and certainly can have none to the House of Representatives of
the United States,-a body which is in no sense a court, which
exercises no functions derived from its once having been a part
96. The only other case at that time was Ex parte Nugent, 18 Fed. Cas.
487 (No. 10375) (C.C.D.C. 1848).
97. Stewart v. Blaine, 8 D.C. (1 MacArth.) 453, 472 (1874).
98. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
99. Id. at 184-85. Several English cases were cited where the power of the
legislature was upheld based upon its judicial character.
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of the highest court of the realm, and whose functions, so far
as they partake in any degree of that character, are limited to
punishing its own members.... .00
The Kilbourn case cited an earlier English case, which in discussing
the contempt power of the House of Commons made an argument
which Justice Miller undoubtedly looked to as authority for his deci-
sion. That case was Kielley v. Carson,11 decided in Newfoundland in
1842, just thirty-eight years before. In that case, Kielley was held
in contempt of the House Assembly of Newfoundland, a British colony.
He claimed that the Assembly had no contempt power. In opposition'
to this claim it was said that the Assembly is analogous to the House
of Commons and therefore did have the power. The court, in holding
that there was no contempt power, distinguished the House of Com-
mons as sui generis with respect to the contempt power of a legisla-
ture.
The House of Commons has this power,... not because it is a
representative body with legislative functions, but by virtue of
ancient usage and prescription; the lex et consuetudo Parliamenti,
which forms a part of the common law of the land, and according
to which the High Court of Parliament, before its division, and
the House of Lords and Commons since, are invested with many
peculiar privileges, that of punishing for contempt being one....[A]II those bodies which possess the power of adjudication
upon, and punishing in a summary manner, contempts of their
authority, have judicial functions,... except only the House of
Commons, whose authority, in this respect, rests upon ancient
usagel 0Z
The Kilbourn decision has been criticized for its historical conclu-
sions.1O3 Yet, even amidst the fuzzy haze of history, there is unanimity
in the opinion that the American power of contempt of Congress is
derived from English Parliamentary powers of contempt. History
also supports the finding in the Kilbourn case that this Parliament was
once a holder of judicial as well as legislative powers. Whether the
English decisions upholding Parliament's power of contempt are
rationalized on the basis of that body's former judicial nature, or upon
the necessity or usage of Parliament qua legislature, is the issue
around which revolves the logical problem of precedent However,
no matter how one concludes in this debate, the fact nonetheless re-
mains that Congress is not Parliament, that the power has been exer-
cised for over a century, and that there are other rationales for its
having the contempt power than the claimed parliamentary basis.
100. Id. at 189.
101. 4 Moore 63, 13 Eng. Rep. 225 (P.C. 1842).
102. Id. at 89-90, 13 .Eng. Rep. at 235. (Emphasis added.)
103. Potts, supra note 66, at 692-97.
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The perfection of the precedential syllogism is important only in
understanding the climate of the birth of the power, and its original
raison d'etre, and of course in weighing its position for the purpose
of reappraisaL
The Court also discussed the Dunn decision, pointing out that it was
consistent, at least historically logical, even with this decision. At the
time of the Dunn case, said the Court, English decisions, interpreting
the power of the House of Commons to punish for contempt, rational-
ized the exercise of the power upon the past use by that House of the
power when it was also a judicial body. At the time of the Kilbourn
case, however, the English decisions had changed, holding that the
House of Commons was no longer a judicial body, and could not
consequently exercise any but legislative powers, which does not
include the power of contempt of the legislature.
By dicta, if not strong implication, this case can be considered as
holding that there is no congressional contempt power, other than as
specifically granted to Congress by the Constitution. By actual deci-
sion, the case seems to hold that even if there is a congressional con-
tempt power, the courts may still inquire into the jurisdictional basis
of its exercise. Its more academic value lies in the historical discussion
of the subject.
In 1857, a federal statute was enacted authorizing punishment for
contempt of Congress.104 Prior to that time, the contempt power was
exercised under a claimed, inherent right. The contumacious indi-
vidual was brought before the Bar of the offended House by the Ser-
geant-at-Arms, at the behest of the officer of the House, and sum-
marily dealt with. His imprisonment at the House, if any, concluded
with the end of the congressional session. The procedure under the
statute requires the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the
House, after deciding to punish an individual for contempt, to send the
case to the United States attorney for the district where the contempt
was committed. He in turn, presents the case to a Grand Jury, which
decides whether or not to indict the contemnor. If he is indicted, he
stands trial in federal court as any other accused criminal. At least
one writer has urged that the application of this statute and its later
counterparts ideologically changed the purpose, if not the effect, of the
contempt power to one of punishment instead of coercion. 10 5 He
pointed out that in the majority of cases before the statute, the action
of the particular house of Congress often changed the recalcitrant
witness' attitude to one of co-operation. In many cases, the contemnor
purged himself by co-operating with the Congress. Perhaps for this
104. 11 Stat. 155 (1857), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958).
105. Beck, op. cit. supra note 75, at 6, 7.
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reason, if not from habit, the Congress at first was hesitant to act
under the statute. It has been reported that "until the twentieth cen-
tury Congress was reluctant to use the statutory provisions of 1857
and continued to punish persons summarily. ' ' a More recently, all
contempt citations have been pursuant to the statute. The statute was
upheld formally by the Supreme Court in 1897.107 Interestingly,
punishment through the older practice is not precluded by reason of
the fact that the same act is equally a statutory offense. Both powers
are available. Since the 1857 statute, the focus of judicial review of
congressional contempt cases has changed from one of inquiring
whether or not the power existed, to what the extent of its application
may properly be.
Yet, even in cases presupposing the propriety of Congress' use of
the contempt power, the melody of historical debate about the source
and nature of the power lingered on. In 1917, the Supreme Court
though recognizing the existence of the contempt power of Congress,
if properly employed, harkened back to the situation in England long
ago, thusly:
Undoubtedly what went before the adoption of the Constitution
may be resorted to for the purpose of throwing light on its pro-
visions. Certain it is that authority was possessed by the House
of Commons in England to punish for contempt directly, that is,
without the intervention of courts, and that such power included
a variety of acts and many forms of punishment including the
right to fix a prolonged term of imprisonment. Indubitable also
is it, however, that this power rested upon an assumed blending
of legislative and judicial authority possessed by the Parliament
when the Lords and Commons were one and continued to operate
after the division of the Parliament into two houses dither be-
cause the interblended power was thought to continue to reside
in the Commons, or by the force of routine the mere reminiscence
of the commingled powers led to a continued exercise of the wide
authority as to contempt formerly existing long after the founda-
tion of judicial-legislative power upon which it rested had ceased
to exist.105
During the period of English history notorious for the emergence
of an active and powerful Parliament, and typified by a broad use of
the contempt power in asserting its authority, there were abuses and
misuses at the expense of those not then in favor.109 Yet, in more
modern times there has been a shift toward restraint in the use of the
contempt vehicle by Parliament.210 The Royal Commissions more fre-
106. Id. at 7.
107. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
108. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 533 (1917).
109. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957)..
110. Keeton, Trial by Tribunal (1960).
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quently have conducted the fact-finding investigations which legisla-
tive groups have been wont to handle, and they have generally done so
without coercive powers.111 Now, these Royal Commissions are the
principal source of investigative work in England. They are composed
of specialists; have no enforcing power except in specific and unusual
cases where Parliament granted it in creating the Commission; and
have been responsible for many of the recent great social reforms.
Withal, their hallmark has been fairness, as much as efficiency. On
the other hand, the inverse is so of the situation in the United States.
Originally, the power was used where it was necessary to urge com-
pliance which, once given, dispelled the need for further action. The
procedures, though summary, included some hearing with counsel.
Nowadays, the contempt vehicle is more freely used than ever, and in
an attitude of retributive punishment. 112 Crime, subversion, and in-
security are investigated by the legislature, whereas they are not in
the English political arena.'1" The number of investigations has
greatly multiplied in recent years, 11"4 and the use of the contempt
power in those cases has become more a weapon against individuals,
than a shield of the government.' 5 Individual rights, more and more,
have been subjugated to the passionate political pressures of the
moment-with the contempt power being the sword which the legis-
lature, more and more seeks and uses. 14 The coin has been turned, yet
it looks to history as authority for its new face.
It can be fairly concluded that the powers of contempt which are
now exercised in the United States originally were adopted from
English common law. The inconsistencies and inappropriatenesses
came too as part of the inherited common law package. Though times
have changed, as have political climates, the power has remained, in
fact increased. Paradoxically, the legislative contempt power has
played a lesser role in modern English practice, though the American
offspring has grown to proportions considered by some as monstrous.
This blind heritage, in the hands of power seekers, has created an
anomalous result of kingliness in a government which was conceived
to establish the sovereignty of men.
111. Galloway, Congress and Parliament (1955).
112. Taylor, Grand Inquest (1955).
113. Galloway, op. cit. supra note 111.
114. Maslow, Fair Procedure in Congressional Investigations: A Proposed
Code, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 839 (1954).
115. Carr, The House Committee on Un-American Activities (1952).
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